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Abstract 
Given the crucial importance of the notion of Volksgemeinschaft in Nazi Germany one might 
assume that there existed a common understanding about who did or did not belong to it. 
Before the war, the Nazis clearly prioritised the latter with the Volksgemeinschaft taking shape 
in a process of excluding those deemed to be enemy of the people. When German troops 
crossed into Poland, the balance shifted. Conquering land that could only be turned into 
German living space when settled with Germans, the occupation authorities were suddenly 
confronted with the opposite. Establishing the German Volksgemeinschaft in multinational 
territories now meant sifting through the local population and separating Germans from Poles. 
One might have thought that it should be easy enough to answer what was a simple enough 
question: Who is German in annexed Poland? It was not, as I will show by looking at the 
selection procedure set-up by the provincial government in the Wartheland, the so-called 
German People’s Register. Given the polycratic nature of the Nazi regime it was to be 
expected that this quickly descended into a bitter dispute with rival power factions with rather 
different ideas about how to define Germanness. What is surprising, however, is that it was 
loyal behaviour and not, for example, ‘racial suitability’ that emerged as the primary criterion. 
Surprising, too, is the extent to which the native population subjected to this process was able 
to influence its outcome by using every opportunity to convince the provincial government of 
its German credentials 
  
  
 
 
3 
Introduction 
Volksgemeinschaft might yet prove to be the best way to get at what the National Socialist 
project was about.1 A critical and emotionally highly charged catchword of German political 
discourse already before 1933, it moved centre-stage thereafter. As the recent historiography 
has shown, this—dystopian—vision of a new German Volksgemeinschaft is indispensable not 
only in understanding Hitler’s rise to power, but also in becoming a critical driver in both, the 
authoritarian reshaping of German society and the willingness of so many Germans to 
participate in it.2 The allure of this siren song did not stop at the German borders, however. For 
one thing, it was met with a resounding response by many ethnic Germans across Eastern 
Europe. Shedding their identity as Auslandsdeutsche, i.e. Germans abroad, and stressing their 
claim to be part of this wider German Volk by morphing into Volksdeutsche in a process of 
political self-radicalization, they provided the Nazi regime with the nucleus around which to 
establish the new Volksgemeinschaft across the German borders.3 With the invasion of Poland, 
this became a dominant strand in German occupation policy. After all, the German regime in 
Eastern Europe turned genocidal precisely because the Nazis did not content themselves with 
controlling or exploiting the territories they invaded but were instead bent on turning them into 
German land. It is this link between Volksgemeinschaft and Lebensraum, i.e. living space, that 
was to prove so murderous.  
 So far, the recent discussion on Volksgemeinschaft has not ventured into this field. While 
some of the contributions do explore German wartime society, the focus clearly is on Nazi 
Germany proper and here the consolidation of Nazi power in particular, and less on occupied 
Europe. In line with the other articles in this special issue, I will address this link between 
Volksgemeinschaft and Lebensraum by looking at one actor in the occupied territories: the 
civilian government in the Wartheland, a newly established province in annexed Western 
Poland. Amongst the many German institutions, what role did it play in turning these territories 
into German land and, more specifically, in expanding the German Volksgemeinschaft beyond 
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the borders of the Reich? In answering this question, I will focus on one aspect of Nazi 
population policies: the screening of the native population by the Deutsche Volksliste, or 
German People’s Register (GPR), set up by the provincial government in October 1939 and in 
1941 expanded to the other two provinces of annexed Western Poland. It was created to answer 
what seemed a simple enough question: who was German in the annexed lands? As obvious as 
the answer might have been to many at the start, such certainties soon gave way to bitter inter-
agency disputes as well as protracted negotiation processes with the native population. On one 
level, this was a purely inner-German argument with the provincial government determined to 
hold its ground against interventions by rival power faction within the Nazi regime like the 
Interior Ministry and the SS. Although by no means entirely successful, the provincial 
government not only managed to retain overall administrative control of the German People’s 
Register, but also resisted attempts that questioned its basic rationale. In opposition to demands 
by the SS to turn race into the determining criterion in the selection process, to mention just 
one dispute, I will show that the GPR continued to favour those thought to be willing and 
capable of assimilating into the German Volksgemeinschaft.  
Maybe less obvious but no less decisive was another negotiating process, however, that 
took place on a very different level. Precisely because the German People’s Register required 
people to proactively come forward to prove their commitment to the German cause, it could 
not function as a top-down process only but had to rely on the active participation by the native 
population. True, the nationality conflicts in the inter-war period provided the Nazis with a 
significant number of people who were more than eager to sign up while many more did so 
because the consequences of not being recognized as German were often lethal. Still, 
authorities in the Wartheland did not directly force anybody to apply. Instead, individual 
applicants were expected to make the first step, queue for questionnaires at the local Branch 
Office of the German People’s Register and then submit their application to prove their 
commitment to Germandom. Tellingly, returning the questionnaire did not end the applicant’s 
 
 
5 
involvement or his or her ability to influence the decision process. Applicants were often 
summoned before or petitioned the selection committee and in any case had recourse to a 
multi-level appeals process. No wonder then that complaints started to pile up right after the 
first rulings had been made with applicants sparing no effort and exploiting all legal means to 
appeal an unfavourable decision. It resulted in yet another drawn-out negotiation process.  As I 
will show by utilising the abundance of personal files stored in the Poznan State Archive, a 
source hitherto untapped by historians, applicants became increasingly adept in understanding 
the selection criteria employed and changed their strategies accordingly.4   
Making matters worse was the fact that these two developments overlapped in time: final 
rulings had to be revisited in line with regulatory changes or new arguments brought forward 
by resourceful claimants. In my article, I will retrace these arduous and often very lengthy 
disputes and negotiations by firmly embedding the assessment of how individual applicants 
took on the selection process into an analysis of genesis and operation of the German People’s 
Register itself. Germanness, it will become clear, was an evasive fantasy, as difficult to define 
in Berlin as it was to establish in Poland.  
 
Establishing the German People’s Register 
Nazi visions of the future were everything but optimistic with a sense of fear masking every act 
of aggression as self-defence.5 If the German people were to survive, its rebirth as a 
Volksgemeinschaft had to be accompanied and safeguarded by territorial expansion as only the 
conquest of new living space would provide for the necessary economic and demographic 
muscle to compete on the world stage. Given how central the living space theorem was for the 
Nazi dystopia it is surprising, then, how little effort their leaders spent on elaborating how they 
wanted to get there. Hitler is just the most telling case in point. If there is any consistency in 
his various utterances then it is, firstly, his conviction that German expansion must take place 
not overseas but in Europe and, secondly, to not repeat the mistakes from the past.6 While 
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conquered land could only be turned into German living space when inhabited by Germans, 
Hitler believed it a dangerous folly to assume that this could be achieved by simply 
assimilating its alien population into the German Volk. After all, ‘it is a hardly conceivable 
mistake … to believe that … a negro or a Chinese would become a German just because he 
learns German … and perhaps to give his vote to a German political party’, Hitler states in 
Mein Kampf.7 No wonder that Prussian attempts to assimilate the Polish population in its 
eastern provinces failed, as Hitler elaborated in more detail in his sequel, the so-called Second 
Book. In contrast, a ‘völkisch state’ would have to radically change course and  
 
muster the determination either to seal off these alien racial elements, so that 
the blood of its own people will not be corrupted again, or … without further 
ado remove them and hand over the vacated territory to its own national 
comrades.8 
 
A blueprint for Nazi population policy this was not. Given Hitler’s criticism of Prussian 
Germanization policies, for example, one will be surprised to find out that the annexation of 
Austria and later the Sudeten and the Memel territories did not lead to a comprehensive 
screening of the population to weed out non-Germans. Instead, every Austrian citizen simply 
became a German citizen as did Czechoslovaks and Lithuanians. True, the Nazis did make 
exceptions—but only by ruling those out who had moved into these territories after they had 
been severed from the Austrian or German empire. Indeed, the Interior Ministry explicitly 
stipulating that the automatic transfer of citizenship ‘is not dependent from belonging to a 
specific people or race’, including Jews, Czechs and Lithuanians.9 Here, annulling the 
consequences of the Paris Peace Treaties and restoring German power in Eastern Europe was 
clearly the overarching aim.  
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With the invasion of Poland, changes in policy seemed necessary. If, before the outbreak 
of war, collective transfer of citizenship was the rule in incorporated territories, this gave way 
to a more discriminatory selection process once large swathes of territories were annexed that 
had never belonged to Germany (or Austria) before. The first step in this direction was Hitler’s 
decree of 8 October 1939 subdividing Western Poland into the three provinces of Danzig-West 
Prussia, Wartheland and—later—Upper Silesia and incorporating them into the German Reich. 
Unwilling to confer German citizenship to all the roughly nine million people living in these 
three provinces, the Nazis took recourse to the fracture introduced into German citizenship law 
in 1935 demoting Jewish Germans to lesser so-called state citizens (Staatsangehörige). In 
annexed Western Poland, however, Jews were now barred outright and the two-class system 
employed to distinguish between people of ‘German or related blood’ on the one hand and 
‘ethnic Germans’ on the other, with only the latter becoming fully fledged Reich citizens 
(Reichsbürger).10 For Arthur Greiser, however, the new head of the provincial government and 
party in the Wartheland, this did not go far enough. Given that his province was established on 
territory which, before 1919, had mainly belonged to Congress Poland, he complained that 
these regulations would not allow him to exclude Poles who according to Nazi ideology were 
also of ‘related blood’. Instead of waiting for further instructions from Berlin, he rushed to 
establish facts on the ground instructing Dr Karl Albert Coulon, the head of his nationality 
desk, to come up with a more exclusive screening system.11 Dubbed the Deutsche Volksliste, or 
German People’s Register, it was proclaimed on 28 October 1939 stipulating that ‘[a]nyone 
registered with the Deutsche Volksliste is German’.12  
It was only one week later, that the party newspaper Ostdeutscher Beobachter announced 
the imminent ‘registration of Germandom’. Residents of Posen, the provincial capital, who 
were either members of a ‘German … organization’ or of ‘German blood but due to Polish 
terror [had been] unable to act in German ways’ were requested to collect a questionnaire at the 
offices of the new German People’s Register during the second and third week of November.13 
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That the occupiers were not content with a record of German descent but additionally 
emphasised the applicant’s behaviour could not have come as a surprise to anybody who still 
remembered the previous weekend edition of the paper. Under the headline ‘It is conviction 
that matters’, this edition devoted the first two pages to Greiser’s official inauguration, during 
which he announced that his government would judge people primarily based on their 
willingness ‘to work for Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist state’.14   
Before the selection committees had a chance to even begin, the entire process came to a 
grinding halt. Unsettled by Greiser’s solo act and concerned that an official recognition of an 
applicant as German would automatically entitle him or her to German citizenship and thus fall 
clearly under its jurisdiction, the Interior Ministry stepped in and imposed an immediate stop 
until it was ready to issue new guidelines.15 It did so only a few days later on 25 November 
1939 by falling back on a definition of German ethnicity (‘deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit’) that 
the Interior Ministry had used after the break-up of Czechoslovakia to allow the minority 
ethnic German community living in the newly established so-called Protectorate to acquire 
German citizenship even though the Protectorate was not incorporated into the German Reich: 
 
 Of German ethnicity (deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit) is he who declares 
himself to be part of the German Volk provided this declaration is backed up 
by certain facts like language, education, culture, etc.16  
 
In grounding citizenship in the applicant’s ethnic identity and equating the latter with a specific 
social practice and commitment to Germandom one could assume that the Interior Ministry had 
taken some cues from Greiser’s German People’s Registry. However, this link between ethnic 
identity and compliant behaviour antedated the war. After all, the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 
had followed a similar logic by stipulating that German citizenship was restricted to the person 
‘of German or related blood who proved through his behaviour that he was willing and able to 
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serve the German people’.17 If ‘völkisch disloyalty’ had thus become a criterion for expelling 
people from the German Volksgemeinschaft, it seemed only consistent to turn völkisch loyalty 
into a prerequisite to join the Volksgemeinschaft.18 According to the Interior Ministry’s 
perspective, it also outweighed German ancestry: 
 
Since the declaration of belonging to the German Volk is crucial it is in fact 
possible to accept as German a person who is partially or fully of alien stock. 
Vice versa, it is possible in particular circumstances that due to his 
commitment (Bekenntnis) somebody must be seen as belonging to an alien 
people even he is of partial or full German stock.19 
 
This focus on the applicant’s behaviour should have smoothed the conflict given that the 
ethnocrats in the Wartheland, too, considered this to be the crucial criterion. It did not. For 
once, they objected to the leeway allowing officials to base their final ruling on the applicant’s 
‘overall behaviour’. If this was satisfactory and, moreover, the applicant deemed a ‘desired 
addition to the population’, then ‘the decision … must reflect this generously’.20 More 
importantly, however, was the threat to how Greiser wanted to run the German People’s 
Registry. While not in a position to impose his view on the governments across annexed 
Western Poland, Greiser was determined to resume the selection process brought to an abrupt 
halt from Berlin and do so with as little changes as possible. It is for this reason why the 
criticism quickly turned to the questionnaire proscribed by the Interior Ministry and deemed 
‘unfit …to determine the applicant’s ethnic identity in a responsible way’.21 If the provincial 
government wanted to ensure that, as Coulon put it, ‘no völkisch dubious elements [was to] 
remain in the völkisch battle zone’, more data had to be collected.22 So instead of replacing the 
questionnaire compiled in the Wartheland by the one imposed from Berlin, applicants were 
required to fill out an additional so-called supplementary questionnaire that would better allow 
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to determine the two key criteria for German ethnicity (Volkszugehörigkeit): ‘German’ heritage 
and, above all, the alleged ‘commitment to Germandom’ under Polish rule. The questionnaires 
had then to be filed with the Branch Office (Zweigstelle) of the German People’s Registry 
attached to the local county commissioner or city major which would also issue a first ruling 
within one week. Reflecting the significance of this procedure, the provincial government also 
introduced a comprehensive appeals process allowing applicants to lodge a complaint with the 
District Office (Bezirksstelle) and, in case of divergent rulings, bring their case for a final 
ruling at the Central Office (Zentralstelle) in Posen, headed by Greiser or his deputy.  
The selection process resumed in early 1940, only weeks after the completion of the so-
called first short term plan in which roughly 90,000 people were deported into the General 
Government from all over the Wartheland. On instructions by Reinhard Heydrich, whose SS 
Reich Security Main Office had assumed overall control over deportations from annexed 
Poland, they were to make room for 40,000 ethnic Germans from the Baltics. Arriving under 
the so-called Back-home-to-the-Reich scheme directed by Heydrich’s superior Heinrich 
Himmler as newly appointed Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom, they 
were one of the first to follow German propaganda calls to exchange their ancestral homeland 
for settlement in conquered Poland. These population shifts are worth mentioning, as they 
might help to explain why officials were quickly inundated with applications, thousands of 
questionnaires piling up in Posen alone. Witnessing neighbours being dragged out of their 
houses and forced to leave within a few hours to make place for a family from Riga, for 
example, must have sent a strong signal in favour of a proactive engagement with the occupiers 
to avoid a similar fate. All the more so, as this first short term plan was followed by three more 
deportation waves that only came to a halt in March 1941 when they threatened to interfere 
with the invasion of the Soviet Union. By this time, more than 200,000 people had been 
removed from the Wartheland.23  
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The intervention of the Interior Ministry notwithstanding, being recognized as German in 
the Wartheland was both more difficult than and different from the practices in the rest of 
annexed Poland. When the selection process resumed in spring 1940, the provincial 
government had made sure that it would follow the rationale drawn up before the Interior 
Ministry’s had forced it to a halt. The German People’s Register, at any rate, was not 
dissolved, nor was the idea dropped to instruct officials to further subdivide those registered 
into two groups A and B—a hierarchy not allowed for by the Interior Ministry and unique to 
the Wartheland. In line with the announcement in the Ostdeutscher Beobachter from early 
November 1939, group A was reserved for so-called Germans by commitment 
(Bekenntnisdeutsche) while Germans by descent (Stammesdeutsche) were to be sorted into 
group B. The decisive criteria for both were the applicant’s behaviour prior to the German 
invasion. As explained in a manual distributed by the provincial government in an attempt to 
keep the disruptions by the intervention of the Reich Ministry to a minimum: ‘The fundamental 
prerequisite for belonging to the German Volk is: The commitment to the German Volk in times 
of völkisch alien rule’. For registration in group A, this was laid out to be rather straight-
forward and required the applicant to have taken an active role in the public life of the ethnic 
German minority before the German invasion whether this was by becoming a member of a 
German sports club or a German political party.24 Heinrich Weiß, a pharmacist from Posen, 
was just this type of person: Born in 1902, he was a member of several German social, cultural 
and economic associations and a leading functionary in the Jungdeutsche Partei, the most 
active and right-wing party within the ethnic German community.25 Moreover, he also reported 
about having been persecuted on behalf of his ‘commitment to Germandom’, which was a 
discrete field in the supplementary questionnaire, claiming to have suffered from economic 
boycott, house searches and eventually arrest and deportation during the first days of the war. 
Weiß was swiftly registered, receiving the first identity card issued by the German People’s 
Register, and becoming a foremost supporter of the occupation regime.26 Stanislaus Dokowicz, 
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a business man from Wollstein, was another model German. Although he had never joined a 
German political party, there were other ways to play a significant role in the life of the ethnic 
German community. In Dokowicz’s case, by becoming a long-time member of the trade and 
school associations of the ethnic German community and—as he pointed out—sparing no 
expenses to allow his three children to attend a German private school. Obviously, he also 
claimed to have been persecuted, indeed ‘destroyed economically by a boycott’. What makes 
this application so interesting, however, is that he did not even try something else. While he 
made much of having married a German woman and picking German names for his children, 
the selection committee surely could not have failed to notice that not only was his first and 
last name Polish but so were those of his parents and grandparents making him—at least 
according to the selection criteria of the German People’s Registry—a person of Polish 
descent. In this case, it did not matter as commitment to the German cause trumped Polish 
ancestry. Stanislaus Dokowicz and his entire family were duly sorted into group A.27  
Interestingly, it was more difficult with the so-called Germans by descent as—unlike 
suggested by the term—German descent was a necessary, but not sufficient precondition. In 
line with the basic rationale of the German People’s Register, the applicants also had to 
persuade the occupiers that it was only for ‘Polish pressure that they had not dared to commit 
themselves to the German Volk’. Failure to do so, if, in other words, the screening commission 
concluded that they had ‘committed themselves to the Poles’, German descent was not enough 
as Richard Ast, an owner of a small company producing toiletries from Posen, was to find out. 
While he and his wife could prove that all their grandparents had German names, his family 
had lost its way. The green booklet specified several examples to help officials make their 
decisions noting, for example, that the language spoken at home could be taken as ‘sign of 
their völkish commitment’ as could sending their children to a Polish school, while, obviously, 
‘[a]nyone’ giving them Polish names ‘is as a rule not German’.28 Family Ast had done all this 
as they had to admit on the supplementary questionnaire: sent both of their children to Polish 
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schools although Posen did not lack German schools, named their daughter Halina and even 
failed to understand that her statement to have two native languages, German and Polish, 
would be seen by the selection committee as an indication for the family speaking Polish at 
home. Richard Ast’s assurance, that it was only due to business considerations that he ‘had not 
been able to commit himself to Germandom’, did not convince the officials of the German 
People’s Register.29 He and his family were rejected in mid-April 1940. As in many other 
cases, however, this was the beginning and not the end of a protracted and complicated case 
that the provincial government took over three years to decide.  
 
Modifying the German People’s Register 
It did not take too long, until the provincial government realised the degree to which the high 
expectations placed on the applicants’ conduct during the inter-war curtailed the number of 
people accepted onto the German People’s Register. This was bad news given that many more 
‘Germans’ were needed to build up the party, staff the administration and, more generally, 
secure and strengthen the hold on a territory with nine out of ten people being Polish. Even the 
selection committees began questioning the process when they had to turn away applicants 
who they considered to be German but who—according to the strict criteria set out in the green 
booklet—were seen to have made just one compromise too much in their day to day life in 
Poland. Initially, these applications were compiled on a local level as so-called doubtful cases 
to be revisited later. But as the number increased significantly over the course of the first few 
months, officials of the German People’s Register in the districts of Posen and Hohensalza 
apparently started to reconsider a recent argument with their colleagues in Litzmannstadt, the 
third district in the east of the Wartheland. There, the district president Fritz Uebelhoer had 
asked for special permission to roll-out a selection process that was even more fine-grained and 
comprehensive. Initially opposed by Coulon and the ethnocrats in Posen, they eventually had 
to admit that the key criteria of the German People’s Register, the ‘commitment to 
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Germandom’, had to be interpreted in a more flexible manner in a territory that, like 
Litzmannstadt, had never belonged to Germany and where a much less pronounced German 
social and cultural life had exposed ethnic Germans ‘much more …  to a slowly, non-violent 
Polonization, a percolation in ethnically alien (völkischen Fremdboden) ground’.30 So instead 
of rejecting those who did not fit the criteria for groups A and B, Uebelhoer expanded the 
German People’s Registry by three additional groups C, D and E. Whereas the criteria for A 
and B were similar to those in Posen, applicants with a ‘deficient national identity’ but only 
‘slightly Polonized’ were not rejected as ‘doubtful cases’ in Litzmannstadt but sorted into 
group C, furnished with an identity card that entitled them to be treated as Germans, too, and to 
be put in line for German citizenship. Finally, applicants who while of German descent were 
found to be ‘passively’ or ‘actively Polonized’ were registered in groups D and E. Unlike 
members of the other groups, however, they were explicitly excluded from German citizenship 
with the latter being reported to the Gestapo as dangerous ‘renegades’.31  
From mid-1940 onwards, this model was finally extended to the western parts of the 
Wartheland with an update to the green booklet describing group C as reserved for ‘people of 
German descent who, while having engaged with Polishdom in the past, today behave in a way 
that shows that they possess all the prerequisites to become full members of the German 
Volksgemeinschaft’.32 Many of those earlier classified as doubtful cases and previously 
rejected, were transferred into this group while others, who had applied later or appealed a 
previous ruling, could now do so with higher chances of success. Hedwig Swiatkowski, a 
married woman from Posen, for example, did encounter some difficulties at first. Applying in 
June 1940 because her father and brothers had already been recognized as Germans and feeling 
‘very bitter to be considered a Pole when amongst them’, she was rejected initially.33 As her 
further correspondence with the officials of the German People’s Register indicates, she clearly 
grasped just how important it was to convince the authorities that at least when it came to her 
commitment to Germandom she could be counted on. In her appeal, she stated to have almost 
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been executed by the Polish government for espionage—a claim that remained unsubstantiated 
and was quickly dismissed by the German authorities. As the notes in the margins of her file 
reveal, the officials did, however, take umbrage at the Polish names of two of her grandparents 
and her husband who had refused to even apply.34 In an angry reply she appealed the ruling 
with the District Office of the German People’s Registry, challenging officials ‘to prove that 
she has ever acted against the German interest’ while ‘brusquely rejecting’ any notion that she 
went along with the Poles. Moreover, she asserted, she would only speak German with Gerhard 
and Rudolf, her two young sons. If, however, ‘I am to be reproached only because I have a 
Polish husband’, this would be a ‘great injustice’ given that it has not been a problem with so 
many ‘thousands’ of other women.35 When she was told in no uncertain terms that her 
commitment to Germandom could only be trusted if she divorced her husband, she quickly 
changed her mind. Four days later, she notified the Central Office that she had filed for a 
divorce pleading to ‘now’ be issued with temporary identity cards that would allow her 
children to attend a German school.36 With the divorce not yet settled when her appeal came up 
at the end of 1940, she was rejected again.37 As she learned during yet another visit to the 
District Office not everything was lost, however, if she proved herself worthy to be recognized 
as German. As the official recorded in a note for his superiors: ‘I have disclosed to her that 
after the divorce is finalised nothing would speak against admitting her’.38 In a sign of good 
will, the District Office instructs the German school to admit her children and, two months 
later, accepted the entire family into group C after the courts had dissolved her marriage.39 
Still, being recognized as German remained harder in the Wartheland than in any of the 
other two provinces in annexed western Poland. Too hard for Richard Ast and his family when 
they appealed the first ruling of the GPR’s Branch Office from April 1940. Putting more effort 
into his second attempt by trying to construct a life narrative that portrayed him as a model 
German in turbulent times, he pointed out that he was ‘confirmed and married in German and 
educated according to German tradition’, stayed away from any Polish associations and, 
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together with his entire family, was of ‘pure German heritage’. It is unclear whether he was 
told the reasons why he was not accepted into the German People’s Register as they were not 
usually communicated on paper when a person was rejected for the first time. But even if this 
had not been the case, by then word must have spread among the applicants what the Germans 
were looking for. In any case, when Ast lodged his complaint he had had a much better sense 
of what must have scuppered his application and addressed it head on: Yes, he had not sent his 
children to a Polish school, but only because as a manufacturer of perfumes he was dependent 
on the supply of ethyl alcohol provided by the government. This, he was made to understand, 
would dry up if he sent his children to a German school.40 In line with the procedure set out in 
the green booklet, his complaint was forwarded to the GPR’s District Office that requested all 
available records and a full report from the local Branch Office in preparation for its ruling.41 
Defending its decision, the manager of the Branch Office did not deny that ‘Richard Ast and 
his wife are of German origin’. What was decisive, however, was the fact that they ‘had not 
committed themselves to Germandom and had been members of the Polish protestant 
community’. Still, given that this decision was taken in April 1940, i.e. at a time when the 
German People’s Register consisted only of the two groups A and B, now the District Office 
‘might consider registration in group C’.42 The District Office, however, remained 
unconvinced and rejected the family again one week later.  
No intention to give up, and apparently also not deterred from reading on the rejection 
form that ‘this decision is final’ and ‘further submissions cannot be answered’, Ast turned to 
help from outside of the Wartheland.43 In early September, he petitioned Hitler personally, 
explaining that ‘although of pure German origin’ he was now in in ‘great danger’ to lose his 
livelihood if he was not finally recognized as German.44 For further details, he included 
another letter that he wrote to Himmler on the same day. Although Himmler was not yet 
directly involved in the German People’s Register, he was responsible for resettling ethnic 
Germans from Eastern Europe in annexed Poland. In their case, however, Richard Ast claimed, 
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voicing some of the frustration many ethnic Germans felt in the Wartheland, nobody was 
interested whether they had belonged to a Polish organization or sent their children to a 
German school. In fact, he asserted, ‘some of them cannot even speak German’ and demanded 
to know whether ‘we, of pure German origin and of German sentiment are … really to be 
expelled from the German Volksgemeinschaft’?45 Like many in Western Poland, Ast also had 
relatives in Germany. One of them, Otto Ast, a party leader in Cologne, now also intervened. 
In a sharp and angry letter to the provincial government he stated that there was ‘nothing to 
question, neither whether [his cousin] belonged to the German people, since he had proven 
this, nor that he was of German sentiment’. In a barely veiled threat he wrote that his party 
district had asked one of their members on party business in Posen to look into this affair. He, 
in any case, would not let this rest as rejecting his cousin ‘constituted the greatest humiliation 
for me as a political leader and I would do anything I can to prevent this from happening’.46  
According to the guidelines, the District’s Office confirmation of the Branch Office’s 
rejection should have closed Richard Ast’s case for good. As with many others, however, it did 
not, particularly when the German People’s Register came under pressure from outside to 
justify its decisions. Coulon reprimanded Otto Ast for his ‘inappropriate claims’, as he 
informed the District Office. But he also asked them to re-evaluate his case.47 At first, it seems, 
the District Office bowed to this pressure accepting him for the first time onto the German 
People’s Register, if only in group D. Only a month later, however, and before Richard Ast 
was informed, this ruling was reversed and he was again rejected. This time, however, the blow 
was softened by informing him that he might be granted German citizenship later.48 Obviously, 
Richard Ast appealed again. 
 
Extending the German People’s Register across annexed Poland 
There can be no doubt that the expansion of the German People’s Register in the Wartheland in 
mid 1940 broadened the support base of the occupation regime. It was equally clear, however, 
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that the selection process and thus the transfer of German citizenship in the Wartheland 
remained both more restrictive than in the other two provinces in annexed Poland and at odds 
with the guidelines set out by the Interior Ministry.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the more time passed, the bigger the dissatisfaction in Berlin and 
across annexed Poland with the provincial governments increasingly criticising each other in 
their handling of the selection process. New attempts to harmonize selection criteria were 
initially pushed mainly by the Interior Ministry and received a new sense of urgency when 
Himmler got involved too. After more than a year of acrimonious negotiations, a ‘new’ 
selection procedure was finally introduced all across annexed Poland in March 1941 that for all 
intents and purposes looked very similar to the one pioneered in the Wartheland.49 Adopting 
not only the name from Greiser’s undertaking, the new German People’s Register had basically 
the same application, decision and appeals process and selected the applicants into equally 
finely graded groups, even if they were now reduced to four and had received Arab numerals, 
i.e. 1-4 instead of A-D. Coulon was clearly satisfied with the outcome claiming that ‘the 
concluded arrangement across the Reich would not have happened without the groundwork and 
the experience in the Wartheland’.50 Still, older concerns about Berlin trying to bring in a more 
lenient selection process than the one pursued in the Wartheland had not been put to rest 
entirely. In particular there was little appreciation for the Interior Ministry’s position that—as 
set out in the introduction to the implementing provisions—‘active engagement for 
Germandom is … no prerequisite for … registration’ as ‘even an indifferent or bad German 
still remains a German’ resulting in slightly more inclusive formulations describing the 
selection criteria for each group.51 Still, Greiser saw no need to fundamentally revisit the 
rulings already made. Instead, the selection committees were instructed to finish processing all 
available applications first and only then proceed to regroup the applicants according to the 
new guidelines.52  
In practice, however, the German People’s Register did become more inclusive. Not 
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primarily, it seems, in the regrouping process as Greiser had made it clear that ‘it was generally 
… to be expected’ that somebody sorted into group A would automatically end up in group 1 
etc.53 However, new applications were judged by the new and slightly more inclusive set of 
criteria as were the many appeals against either previous rejections or the sorting into a lower 
group. This is the way, in which Ast finally succeeded. Apparently, the second rejection by the 
District Office had been controversial even within the administration given that it annulled a 
previous one which, only a few weeks earlier, had advised his registration in group E. 
Moreover, it did clearly not make use of all the information that Richard Ast had or could have 
provided. An initial summons for him and his entire family to appear before the District Office 
was withdrawn, depriving Richard Ast to explain his case in person.54 And just a few days after 
he had been rejected for the second time, three affidavits signed by well-known ethnic 
Germans from Posen arrived. Two of them were on a form issued by the German People’s 
Register for this purpose. Asking guarantors to confirm, amongst others, the applicant’s proper 
behaviour as a German during the inter-war period, they allowed a good insight into the 
priorities guiding the selection process. In this case, they were not quite as strong as Ast had 
hoped for. While confirming that the family spoke German at home and that the children were 
raised in German, both guarantors added that Polish was also spoken and that the family 
attended not only the German but also the Polish protestant church. They left no doubt, 
however, that over the last fifteen years they had known Ast he never tried to pass off as a Pole 
and that they always perceived him to be German.55 Importantly, one guarantor, a salesman for 
a German company, also confirmed the strong economic pressure he had faced: boycotted 
because he was ‘known to be German’, he was finally ruined by ‘Polish banks denying him 
credit’.56 This time, with fresh evidence and a slightly relaxed set of criteria after the 
introduction of a reformed German People’s Register in all parts of annexed Poland, his family 
was finally accepted in June 1941—into group 4.57  
Richard Ast was still not satisfied. After doggedly pursuing his appeals process that had 
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lasted almost as long as the German occupation, he was not willing to settle for the lowest 
group. True, he and his family had now secured access to, for example, German schools, pay 
and pensions and were protected from being treated as Pole and thus much better shielded from 
arbitrary discrimination, arrest or murder. But when Greiser had opted for a multi-tiered 
selection system with loyal behaviour determining not just whether applicants were recognized 
as German, but further specifying into which of the four groups of the German People’s 
Register they were sorted, he had done so for a reason. Joining the Nazi party, for example, or 
advancing into positions of leadership in the administration or the economy, was possible only 
for the most trustworthy, i.e. only those in group 1, with members of group 2 yet to prove their 
dedication to the German cause and, for example, explicitly also barred from becoming 
university professors and, more generally, from any teaching that involved matters of ideology 
(‘Weltanschauungsfragen’). And yet, as so-called Bekenntnisdeutsche they were much better 
off than the Stammedeutschen in groups 3 and 4. Excluded from the civil servants, any 
teaching profession and even banned from joining most Nazi organization, they were, 
moreover, not entirely safe from expropriation and deportation to the Reich for re-education if 
their farm, apartment, shop or factory was needed, for example to house the incoming ethnic 
Germans from Eastern Europe.58 In fact, the red identity card issued to Richard Ast as a 
member of group 4 would make him a preferred target for expropriation as they, unlike 
members of group 3, could not expect any meaningful compensation. No wonder, then, that 
Ast aimed for group 2 and the blue identity card—a long stretch given the enormous 
difficulties he had experienced to make it onto the German People’s Register in the first place. 
He tried, nevertheless, and appealed for the fourth time, now demanding to be sorted into a 
higher group.  
Astonishingly, he was successful again although he had to wait for more than a year until 
the District Office elevated him into group 3. The case ruling leaves no doubt, however, that 
officials thought that he had now reached the end of the line. While not ignoring the family’s 
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German origin, they were not willing to forget that Ast had sent his children to Polish schools 
and attended a Polish church. Still, ‘although the family Ast has slipped into Polishdom, it 
cannot be proven that they acted against German interests. Therefore, sorting into group 3 
seems justified’.59 For Richard Ast this was still not good enough. On the one hand, he like 
many who appealed the rulings of the German People’s Register, was clearly upset by how 
their sense of being German could be questioned. As Ast had accused Coulon on a previous 
occasion, ‘he and his family had been wronged’ by the authorities.60 On the other hand, 
reasonable security against arbitrary discrimination only came with group 2. So he appealed 
again, for the fifth time, now demanding the green identity card of group 3 to be replaced by a 
blue one.61 To bolster his chances, he made sure that the German People’s Register received 
yet another affidavit, which again stressed the severity of his boycott by the Polish 
government. If he had ‘sent his children to a Polish school’—the affidavit read—then ‘not out 
of inner conviction, but of necessity to earn the bread for his family’.62 Summoned to make his 
case before the Central Office, the final arbiter in the Wartheland, he was reproached for 
having picked Polish schools. However, Richard Ast eventually succeeded in a ‘personal 
discussion’ to convince Greiser, who chaired the panel, that he was ‘one of those people, 
who—forced by political circumstances and to avoid any economic or other disadvantages—
had to make some concessions to the Poles but who were able to retain their Germandom’.63 
Finally, after a process that had started two and a half years earlier and was marred by many 
setbacks, Richard Ast had litigated his way through a comprehensive appeals process. After 
having been rejected twice outright, eventually family Ast had come out almost at the top of 
what was a hierarchically differentiated occupation society in Poland.   
 
Racial Screenings 
One question I have hardly touched on so far is that of race—in itself highly suggestive of the 
selection process in the Wartheland and by extension in the annexed Polish territories. 
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Interestingly, neither the Interior Ministry nor the occupation authorities in Poland felt the need 
for racial criteria in defining Germanness. Indeed, they would not easily fit a selection process 
that, like the German People’s Register in the Wartheland, rewarded past compliant behaviour 
over everything else. Greiser’s close relationship to Himmler notwithstanding, he did not give 
in when Himmler started to criticise that decisions were based on ‘purely outward confessions 
to belong to the German Volk (language, upbringing, culture etc.)’ when they should 
‘primarily’ require a ‘positive assessment of racial belonging’.64 In fact, Greiser did the 
opposite when he promptly instructed officials that ‘racial criteria are not a sound basis on 
which to decide whether the applicant belonged to the German people’.65 Himmler did not let 
go, however. Not least, because a selection process favouring racial criteria would probably 
end up under his control as it was hard to see which other institution but Himmler’s own SS 
Race and Settlement Main Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, RuSHA) would have been 
capable of racially screening so many people. This seemed all the more desirable, as it would 
have greatly facilitated his task to resettle the rapidly increasing number of ethnic Germans. 
Given that people enlisted in the German People’s Register were to be treated as Germans, the 
introduction of stringent racial criteria would drive rejection rates up and thus increase the 
number of houses, farms and companies that could be seized from those who remained Poles 
and handed over to Germans from the Baltics, Wolhynia or Galicia. After running against a 
brick wall with the heads of government in the provinces, Himmler changed tack and focussed 
his pressure on the Interior Ministry.66 When the new German People’s Register was 
eventually introduced across all annexed Poland in May 1941, it did not only—as I have 
pointed out—relax the existing selection criteria. It also introduced an entirely new 
requirement, if only for those in group 3: Before issuing the green identity card, officials had to 
establish that the applicant did not ‘raise racial concerns’.67 For Himmler, this was the much-
anticipated opportunity to become directly involved in the selection process. Only one month 
later, the  SS Race and Settlement Office demanded the right to re-visit all previous decisions 
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regarding applicants already sorted into group 3 and to be given a veto on all applications for 
this group in the future to ensure that only those were accepted who ‘according to their racial 
evaluation, were found suitable’.68  
Given the previous disputes on this matter, negative reactions, not just in the Wartheland, 
were to be expected. On the one hand, the provincial governments in annexed Poland saw this 
as an encroachment on their power which was to be resisted. More importantly, however, they 
understood very well that introducing race as a criterion would undermine the entire rationale 
of the selection process which, as I have demonstrated, aimed at creating a loyal power base 
for the German occupation. Nobody had formulated this clash quite as succinctly as Coulon in 
the previous arguments with Himmler. For him, the danger was that  
 
the demand of the political reality of the day would entirely step back behind 
this purely biological demand. … Among the ethnic Germans it creates the 
impression that the active engagement in the ethnic battles of the past would 
be little appreciated and that in the end a Pole with a positive racial assessment 
would be valued more than a proven ethnic German with a lower racial score… 
Therefore, the individual’s commitment to the ethnic battle must be the 
primary basis for the assessment.69 
 
When the RuSHA started to prepare for sending its men into the Wartheland to subject the 
roughly 70,000 people sorted into group 3 to a racial screening, this resistance only grew. 
Garnering support from Berlin, Coulon explained to the Party Chancellery that, obviously, 
nobody in the Wartheland administration was against racial screenings per se. ‘However’, 
Coulon continued, what needed to be done first was ‘to provide ethnic-political 
(volkstumspolitisch) clarity first’ in order to ‘create an ethnic-politically educated German 
Volksgemeinschaft … and a working German administration’. After all, these were ‘war 
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important tasks … and, therefore, had priority over anything else’. Prolonging the selection 
process and questioning decisions already made would threaten both.70 In a very outspoken 
memorandum, Coulon reminded his superiors that  
the inclusion of racial screening into the selection process of the German 
People’s Register … goes against … its fundamental idea. The People’s 
Register is a summary registration of those of German descent based on their 
behaviour for group 1 and 2, and of their descent for group 3 and 4. … The 
principle … must remain, to distinguish between ethnic questions and racial 
questions.71  
 
In the end, Himmler managed to overcome this resistance only by giving in to Greiser’s 
demand that those deemed racially unfit could be expelled from the German People’s Register 
only, when the SS could guarantee their immediate deportation from the Wartheland to the 
Reich and thus reduce political friction within the province.72 The imperatives of the war 
economy were also not ignored: Picking up on a previous suggestion by Coulon, the SS 
discussed forcibly sterilising those deported to the Reich as it would ‘eliminate them 
biologically’ while retaining their labour power.73 It was only after Greiser’s consent that 
Himmler signed the decree instructing the RuSHA to screen everybody already in or applying 
for group 3 of the German People’s Register ruling that ‘[a] negative result of the racial 
screening will necessarily result in the rejection of the application or the expulsion from the 
German People’s Register’.74 
 It is testament to just how unpopular this was that the criticism from within the 
administration did not die down even after Greiser had signed off on it. His district president in 
Posen, Victor Böttcher, protested that  
 
racial screening is not just an addition to the German People’s Register but 
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represents two conflicting approaches. While some ground their decision on 
whether somebody should be Germanized primarily on how the applicant 
was raised, his behaviour and his character traits, others are judging only by 
outer appearance.75  
 
It only got worse in the following months when the RuSHA dispatched four screening 
commissions with two so-called suitability testers (Eignungsprüfer) each. Driving from one 
Branch Office of the German People’s Register to the next in April and May 1942, they 
managed to screen no less than 67,235 people in just eight weeks and in the end compiled a list 
of 6,227 allegedly ‘racially unfit’, i.e. of people who did not make it into racial groups I to III, 
but were sorted into IV.76  
For the provincial government, this high number seemed to have come as a surprise and 
they quickly moved to contain the damage. Firstly, they ruled out expelling anybody who had 
relatives in group 2 or 1—regardless of his or her assessment by the SS. In the end, expelling, 
for example, the mother who had been sorted into group 3 and was now classified as ‘racially 
unsuitable’ by the SS, meant her eventual deportation from the Wartheland thus tearing the 
family apart. The political unrest this would entail was not hard to imagine and for the 
provincial government it was too big a risk to take. Shortly thereafter, Rolf-Heinz Höppner, 
Coulon’s successor as head of the nationality desk, made the RuSHA understand that, 
secondly, exceptions would also have to be made for anybody with four grandparents of 
German descent.  
The last major confrontation erupted, thirdly, about those on RuSHA’s list who were 
already drafted into the Wehrmacht. As the commander of the military district wrote to 
Greiser, he was alarmed that the RuSHA wanted to strike 748 conscripts off their roll, 53 of 
whom were already at the front. The army asked Greiser ‘to proceed generously’, particularly 
if there were ‘no criminal aspects or serious racial concerns to consider’.77 Greiser agreed, 
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telling his deputy that ‘obviously, everything must be avoided which might dampen the 
enthusiasm of a soldier drafted by the Wehrmacht’.78 Instead, he allowed for the expulsion of 
only those who were sorted into racial evaluation group IVf, i.e. who the RuSHA thought to be 
of Jewish or other allegedly non-European descent. The rest had to be ‘digested’.79 In the end, 
it is very unlikely that any of them were expelled: thirty of them had relatives in group 1 or 2 
or had four grandparents of German descent while only one of the remaining was sorted into 
IVf. But by then, the provincial government had already ruled that anybody deployed to the 
front was to be exempted, too.80 
These exceptions notwithstanding, both the ruling on new applications as well as on 
appeal cases now normally required a clearance from the RuSHA if the applicant was to be 
sorted into group 3. Normally, this was done after the respective body of the German People’s 
Register had come to a decision so as to avoid to subject candidates for the higher groups to 
this screening. This is also how it happened in the case of Richard Ast When the German 
People’s Register District Office in Posen granted his appeal in August 1942 and elevated him 
and his family into group 3, local officials were ordered to issue the identity card ‘only if the 
result of the racial screening is positive for the family’.81 It was only after they had passed this 
test, too, that they received the green identity cards.  
The RuSHA was clearly not satisfied with the exceptions they had to accept and eager to 
expand the number of people to screen beyond those in group 3. On the one hand, to further 
restrict admission to the German People’s Register by, for example, demanding to also make 
racial screening mandatory for those in groups 1 and 2 who could not clearly prove their 
German descent. They were flatly rejected by the provincial government and reminded that the 
criterion for registration in those groups was the applicant’s commitment to the German cause 
before the invasion—regardless of ancestry or even ‘racial suitability’.82 A few months later, 
they tried again, with Böttcher complaining that the SS apparently believed that ‘people with a 
positive racial evaluation could be retroactively accepted into the German People’s Register’. 
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This time it was not about limiting but, in contrast, about extending admission to those 
previously rejected but now found to be of exemplary racial value. Here, the SS failed again 
for elevating racial suitability from a necessary to a sufficient selection criterion would have in 
effect made race trump social and political behaviour and thus undermine the very basis of the 
German People’s Register. For Böttcher, these cases ‘were settled’ and Greiser was asked to 
issue a directive to remedy any ‘remaining lack of clarity’ within the RuSHA.83  
It might have offered a way in for Franz Ryzkewicz, a butcher in Wollstein county, and 
his family. They were rejected for the first time in April 1943.84 Not only had they applied very 
late, more than two years after the German People’s Register was established. It was also that 
Franz Ryzkewicz’s cover letter did not quite fit the expectations the German occupiers had of a 
loyal citizen. Admitting that if he applied ‘against my conviction and against my will’, he was 
doing so only because all his relatives were members of the German People’s Register, some 
of them even fighting in the German Wehrmacht. ‘Why should I together with my family 
remain excluded?’85 It did not help either that three of his six children had Polish names and all 
of them had attended Polish schools. A police inquiry added that while the family spoke 
German at home and through ‘their entire appearance according to language, social contact, 
behaviour of relatives show that they are of German kind’, it could not be securely established 
that they were of German descent. Moreover, although they had been members of neither 
German or Polish organizations they had ‘sided with Polishdom’.86 Ryzkewicz’s appeal was 
rejected in July with the District Office pointing to his late application and the lack of any 
‘commitment to Germandom before 1939’.87 According to his personal file, he seemed to have 
accepted this ruling or at least refrained from appealing again. With the case closed, there was 
no need to subject him and his family to a racial screening. This is, however, what must have 
happened at some point during this application process. Interestingly, the RuSHA judgement 
different significantly from that of the offices of the German People’s Register classifying most 
family members as racially very desirable. It did not help Ryzkewicz. As Böttcher had 
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reiterated, ‘racial suitability’ might be needed for registration in group 3 but it would certainly 
not suffice. 
 The interesting question, then, is what exactly was the effect of Himmler’s intervention 
into the selection process or, more generally, how successful was the attempt to link the 
definition of Germanness to race? Not particularly, it seems, certainly not in the Wartheland. 
The archival material does not allow any speculations about how many applicants were 
initially accepted into group 3 but then not issued with identity cards because they failed to 
pass the racial screening. The number has to be fairly limited, however, as most applications 
were already decided before Greiser agreed to the screening process. This leaves those 6,227 
identified in the spring of 1942 who had already been registered. For those in the Wehrmacht, 
it is fair to assume that their status remained unchanged. Given the ‘current situation with 
filling up the ranks of the Wehrmacht’—Höppner told the RuSHA laconically shortly after 
Stalingrad—it ‘cannot be justified to potentially withhold from the army a larger number of 
recruits’.88 This left those of no interest for or not yet drafted by the Wehrmacht. They seemed 
to have fared even better thanks to Greiser’s proviso that allowed for expulsions of those found 
racially unsuitable only if the SS could also ensure their removal from the province. 
Deportations, however, had been halted in March 1941 amidst the preparations for the invasion 
of the Soviet Union and were never resumed. This might then also explain why there is no 
archival evidence to suggest that even a single person was expelled due to RuSHA racial 
screenings. In the end, the RuSHA might have done some a favour: While the screenings did 
not lead to the expulsion from the German People’s Register, it did lead to those men not yet 
drafted being struck from the military roll. Continuing to enjoy the privileges that came with 
being a German citizen in the annexed territories they were—as even the office of the German 
People’s Register in Litzmannstadt complained—effectively exempt from having to fight for 
them.89 Given that the Wehrmacht lost most its men during the last phase of the war, RuSHA 
verdicts of ‘racial unsuitability’ had become a life saver.  
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 In a sense, the Wartheland had not been the main target for Himmler when pressing for the 
introduction of racial criteria. After all, group 3 in the Wartheland never accounted for more 
than 15 per cent of the roughly 500,000 people in the German People’s Register with 83 per 
cent sorted into groups 1 and 2. The situation was exactly the opposite in the other two 
provinces in annexed Poland with more than 70 per cent registered in group 3, altogether more 
than 1.7 million people.90 Much of Himmler’s criticism of the German People’s Register took 
aim at the allegedly too lenient selection process in these two provinces. Introducing racial 
screening, Himmler had hoped, would put an end to this. No wonder, then, that Albert Forster 
and Fritz Bracht were even less inclined than Greiser to strike a deal. Forster, for example, 
simply denied the SS access to the people accepted by the German People’s Register. He did 
not deny that in some cases it might be useful to ascertain an applicant’s racial suitability. This, 
however, local officials were instructed, was a task not for the RuSHA but fell ‘entirely’ within 
the competence of the Race Policy Office, a party institution and thus under Forster’s control. 
This would ensure that it would not just be about—and this was a side blow to the SS—
‘outward appearance’, but that the ‘outlook on life, lifestyle and character’ also corresponded 
with the ‘image of a German’.91 It seems that the only people the RuSHA did eventually screen 
were those, who applied from within a SS internment camp trying to avoid their imminent 
deportation. It was to no avail, however, as Forster waded in again, reminding the offices of the 
German People’s Register that their decision had to be based on their own ‘personal 
impression’ about whether the ‘applicant and his family were considered to be a desirable 
addition to the population or not’. Information supplied by the RuSHA, including the 
applicants’ racial evaluation, ‘were to be treated as non-binding for the decisions of the 
German People’s Register’.92  
 In Upper Silesia, the RuSHA’s defeat was a slightly more drawn out affair. Initially, 
Bracht simply refused. Racial screenings, he wrote to the RuSHA, were ‘absolutely unwanted’ 
and he would have to ‘reject any such undertaking with full force’ citing potential political 
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unrest given the roughly one million people registered in group 3. Later, he suggested to the 
RuSHA to screen group 4 instead—something mentioned neither by the Interior Ministry nor 
in Himmler’s implementing provisions. With 50,000 people this should be enough—Bracht 
added laconically—‘to keep the RuSHA busy during the war’.93 Bracht had no intention to 
keep even this promise. When the RuSHA started the racial screenings he sent a note to the 
heads of the Branch Offices, secret and by envoy, letting them know:  
My opinion was and still is: The registration of individuals belonging to the 
German people with the Deutsche Volksliste cannot in principle be made 
dependent on the result of a racial screening..94 
There is little evidence that all 50,000 people in group 4 were screened and even less that 
anybody was expelled due to a negative RuSHA result. Instead, state officials decided to 
simply ignore the lists they started to receive from the RuSHA. In Beuthen-Tarnowitz, for 
example, the county commissioner did not even bother to forward them to his superiors—much 
to the chagrin of the local SS office. Deemed to be ‘not relevant for the [conduct] of war they 
were not to be processed for the time being’.95 
 
Conclusion 
It is not without irony that it was the Nazis who by establishing the German People’s Register 
initiated the largest assimilation project in modern German history turning no less than three 
million Poles into Germans. No less surprising is how this was done given that historians 
largely seem to agree that—to cite Eli Nathans—‘the Nazi state relied primarily on racial 
categories to determine whether a person was a German’ or that—now in the words of Oliver 
Trevisiol—‘the population policy in the National Socialist racial state followed the principles 
of racial selection’.96 Even Isabel Heinemann, in the first detailed study of the SS Race and 
Settlement Office, concurs. Himmler, she writes, not only put ‘almost two million people, the 
members of group 3 and 4 of the German People’s Register, in line for racial selection’, he 
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allegedly also succeeded in screening ‘a large part … before the end of the war’.97 Following 
what I would call the ‘racial turn’ in Nazi historiography during the late 1980s it has almost 
become de rigeur to see Nazi Germany as —this the aptly chosen title of a study by Michael 
Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann—a ‘racial state’.98 It seems hard to resist imagining the 
Nazi dystopia of a Volksgemeinschaft as anything else than a ‘racial community’ and it is 
telling that in one of the most impressive recent studies of Nazi Germany the party’s 
mouthpiece Völkischer Beobachter morphed into the ‘Racial Observer’.99 Terminology does 
matter, however. Substituting ‘Rasse’ for ‘Volk’ not only simulates ideological coherence 
where there was a multiplicity of often conflicting strands of right-wing German thought but, 
more importantly, eliminates the very catchword that was instrumental in tying so many 
Germans to the Nazi project. Volk, however, was neither in popular perception nor in the many 
ways used by the party or its officials solely or even primarily defined in racial terms but 
evoking and conserving more traditional and often historical and cultural understandings of 
belonging going back to Herder and Fichte.100  
People at the time and people in power knew this—not least those tasked with sorting out 
the citizenship of the population caught up in the German collapse in the east. Without wanting 
to dedicate too much attention to the legacy of the German People’s Register beyond the 
turning-point of 1945, I think it is precisely this focus on the applicant’s ethnic identity as 
expressed in his or her political and social behaviour as well as economic indispensability and 
not the person’s alleged racial suitability that granted these files a second lease of life in both 
post-war West-Germany and Poland. In West-Germany, they came in handy when deciding 
which refugees from Eastern Europe could claim German citizenship. Soon, German 
authorities were back investigating whether the applicant was an ethnic German—the essential, 
and until 2000 the only, prerequisite for acquiring German citizenship. According to the 
Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) from 1953 and still valid today: 
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Of German ethnicity (deutscher Volkszugehöriger) as defined by this law is he 
who has declares himself to be part of the German Volk in his homeland 
provided this declaration is backed up by certain facts like descent, language, 
education, culture.101  
 
Not only is this a more or less exact copy of the Reich Interior Ministry’s decree from 29 
March 1939 that had guided the screening commissions of the German People’s Register.102 
West-German authorities even decided to accept the decisions made by their Nazi predecessors 
foregoing further inquiry if applicants still had an identity card issued by the German People’s 
Register. Additionally, they proved as flexible as the occupation authorities before when it 
came to establishing the degree of Germanness necessary for German citizenship: During the 
Cold War, i.e. a time of small numbers of refugees from Eastern Europe, West-Germany was 
happy with accepting all members of groups 1-3. After the collapse of the socialist regimes, i.e. 
confronted with a potentially much larger number of applicants whose integration, moreover, 
could no longer be turned into an example of Western largesse overcoming Eastern tyranny, 
German authorities became more choosy suddenly accepting only applicants from groups 1 
and 2.103 In Poland, too, ample use was made of the vast material produced by the German 
People’s Register and left behind when the occupiers fled in haste. Polish authorities simply 
turned the tables and—determined to get rid of the German minority once and for all while 
concerned with the loyalty of the population in the borderlands—putting those in groups 1 and 
2 first in line for forced labour and expulsion. And when the authorities started with the so-
called rehabilitation action, it was made very easy for members of groups 3 and 4 to recover 
their Polish citizenship whereas members of group 2 were subjected to a much more rigorous 
screening process and those in group 1 rejected entirely.104 
It is not hard to see why the Polish authorities embraced the results of the selection 
procedure carried out by their enemies. After all, the German People’s Register was primarily 
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about political loyalty. Fine-tuned over the course of five years, in hundreds of offices by many 
thousands of bureaucrats and affecting millions of people across annexed Poland, the Germans 
had created a selection procedure carefully calibrated towards identifying those who held the 
promise of easy assimilation into the occupation regime and the wider Nazi mission in Eastern 
Europe. Whereas the RuSHA personnel sent to Poland was deliberating where to draw the line 
between an—alien—‘black-brown, … mostly sinister looking’ eyes and a—German—‘rich, 
velvety brown (cow’s eyes brown)’, the ethnocrats in the provincial governments were 
primarily interested in the applicants’ German-friendly behaviour and/or descent. 105 It is 
important to remember, however, that both criteria did not carry equal weight with the so-
called Bekenntnisdeutsche ranked above the Stammesdeutsche. In particular, it would be 
missing the point to assume that they represented two categorically different avenues to 
German Volkszugehörigkeit. After all, German descent was primarily established by checking 
whether the applicant’s grandparents had German sounding names—in other words whether 
they, in turn, had preserved their German identity in the past. No wonder then that genealogical 
‘deficiencies’ could easily be offset by loyal behaviour whereas the active participation in a 
Polish nationalist organization, for example, was something even four German grandparents 
could not fix. Consequently, descent was not simply understood in racial terms or seen as an 
equivalent for racial suitability. If this would have been the case, if racial screenings had 
indeed been intended to settle doubts about an applicant’s descent, the screenings would not 
have targeted those in group 3 and 4 who had to provide proof about their German descent 
anyway to compensate for their alleged lack in loyal behaviour, but those in groups 1 and 2 
instead who were registered on the merits of their loyalty to the German cause alone. As it 
happened, the provincial government was prepared to see Richard Ast, whose German descent 
was beyond doubt, to be rejected by the RuSHA, but not Stanislaus Dokowicz, his four Polish 
grandparents notwithstanding.  
While it is not hard to see why occupation authorities tasked with consolidating German 
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rule in the annexed lands and fully exploit its economic potential gravitated towards a selection 
process that favoured compliant behaviour over racial-anthropological features, this was not 
without its drawbacks. Unlike racial screening, informed entirely by hegemonic knowledge and 
allowing to issue finite decision to a large number of people in little time, assessing behaviour 
was bound to result in a drawn-out and messy process with plenty of leeway for determined 
applicants to argue their case. No matter how hesitant the officials of the German People’s 
Register were to advertise the selection criteria beyond the very general information published 
in calls for the population to apply, with every appeal more information trickled into the open. 
I would like to pause for a moment to re-call the brutality of German rule in occupied Poland. 
So, while decimating the Polish intelligentsia, executing tens of thousands deemed to be a 
security threat, deporting even more either to the General Government or in so-called Polish 
reservations and pressuring Himmler to agree to murder the Jews in the Wartheland in what 
would become the first Nazi extermination camp at Kulmhof, the provincial government was at 
the same time establishing a lengthy selection procedure and granting applicants a 
comprehensive appeals process. Shrewd claimants got away with time and again ignoring 
allegedly final decisions and challenged official rulings by enlisting help from friends and 
relatives from the Reich, pleading with Hitler, Himmler or other Nazi dignitaries and besieging 
the offices of the German People’s Register. In dire need of broad support it is little surprising 
that the German People’s Register was rolled out as an “offer for collaboration” to recruit 
people who could be trusted with staffing the new German administration, running schools, 
taking over businesses and, more generally, speeding up the Germanization of the conquered 
land.106 It is equally unsurprising, however, that the whole procedure soon morphed into a 
negotiating process in which the applicants’ latitude rose in line with their growing insight into 
what criteria mattered and how they were applied. Richard Ast, to refer to a successful case 
discussed, would have faced expropriation and deportation had he accepted the first ruling by 
the Local Branch of the German People’s Register. The most surprising aspect of his case and 
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that of many others is not that he appealed—after all too much was at stake. Surprising is, 
rather, that officials granted his repeated appeals even after having rejected him twice and thus 
technically brought to a close, eventually allowing Ast to bring his case all the way to the 
Central Office and convince Greiser of his loyalty to Germandom and be promoted to group 2. 
 This focus on individual behaviour also allows, I think, to better understand that the 
Volksgemeinschaft Greiser, or Forster and Bracht for that matter, had in mind was not a ‘racial 
community’ but a ‘perpetrator community’. The Germans in the annexed territories were a 
mixed lot, comprising the three million in the German People’s Register, roughly one million 
so-called ethnic German resettlers from the east and a much smaller number of adventurers 
from the Reich. They did not have much in common either: drawn from many different parts of 
Europe and Germany proper and often with only little or no German as the large number of 
German classes indicate that many members of the German People’s Register had to attend. 
What bound them together, however, was that their very existence in this occupied land 
depended on a German victory—a strong motive if ever there was one to encourage their 
radicalization into a community of fate and deed, compelled to do everything in their power to 
contribute to this victory. It might not come as a surprise, then, that in the end Volk and 
‘völkisch belonging’ trumped Rasse and ‘racial suitability’ precisely because it allowed for a 
more flexible discursive framework that was better suited to compute and cloth the political 
requirements of the occupation regimes.  
Given the fractured nature of polycratic rule in Nazi Germany, it would obviously be 
premature to assume that the logic determining the selection process in the Wartheland 
extended to all other occupied lands where the German administration had started screening the 
local population. Race was envisaged to play a much bigger part in, for example, Reinhard 
Heydrich’s plans for the Germanization of occupied Czechoslovakia107, in the various 
iterations of the General Plan East concocted in Himmler’s Main Office for Strengthening of 
Germandom and the Reich Security Main Office108 and not least as a justification for 
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radicalising anti-Jewish policies109. It is worth pointing this out as it highlights the fractured 
nature of the National Socialist regime making every observation about power relations by 
necessity dependent on time and place. In this case, it clearly shows the decisive role the 
provincial governments played in formulating occupation policies and the power it had to push 
it through—even in if this meant opposing Himmler. However, divided the various German 
power factions were about what made a German and who was fit to be assimilated into the 
German Volksgemeinschaft, in annexed Poland, in any case, it was Greiser together with 
Forster and Bracht as the heads of the civilian administration who set the tone. One might be 
excused to think that in what supposedly was a ‘racial state’ the party with the racial argument 
would win. In this case, however, it was Himmler who had to admit defeat. Access to the 
Volksgemeinschaft was determined not by race but by loyalty to the German cause, a—as it 
turned out—surprising negotiable matter battled out between the provincial government and 
the population in annexed Poland.  
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